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According to the “Mill hypothesis”, the tax burden from indirect taxation is 
underestimated because indirect taxes are less “visible” than direct taxes. We 
experimentally test the Mill hypothesis and identify tax framing as a cause of 
fiscal illusion. We find that the tax burden associated with an indirect tax is 
underestimated, whereas this is not the case with an equivalent direct tax. In a 
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 1. Introduction 
“Perhaps ... the money which [the taxpayer] is required to pay directly out of his 
pocket is the only taxation which he is quite sure that he pays at all. ... If all taxes 
were direct, taxation would be much more perceived than at present; and there 
would be a security which now there is not, for economy in the public 
expenditure.” 
     John Stuart Mill (1848: 237) 
 
The quotation above summarizes the “Mill hypothesis” of fiscal illusion. Fiscal illusion 
prevails if people are prone to systematic misperception of the tax burden. The Mill 
hypothesis suggests a particularly relevant aspect of taxation as a cause fiscal illusion: the 
relative “invisibility” of indirect taxes as compared to more “visible” direct taxes. Taxpayers 
may systematically underestimate the tax burden from indirect taxes as compared to direct 
taxes because indirect taxes are incorporated into (and therefore “hidden” in) the prices of 
goods. This hypothesis about a cause of fiscal illusion has a long intellectual pedigree (see 
Buchanan 1967, Schmölders 1960).  
Fiscal illusion may have important consequences because of its potential to distort 
democratic decisions on fiscal issues. The Mill hypothesis suggests that fiscal illusion may 
lead to “excessive” public expenditure (see quotation above). Government spending is 
considered to be “excessive” if a tax-expenditure package is implemented which voters-
taxpayers would have opposed had they correctly perceived the resulting tax burden. 
Therefore, fiscal illusion is a candidate explanation for the dramatic increase in government 
spending experienced in many countries during the 20
th century (e.g., Mueller 2002: Ch. 
19.7). For example, U.S. government expenditures as a percentage of GNP have increased by 
    
approximately 500 percent over the last nine decades (Holsey and Borcherding 1997: 563). Of 
course, the massive government growth has several causes. In fact, various explanations 
which do not refer to fiscal illusion, but are based on the assumption that all agents are 
rational have been suggested to account for this phenomenon (e.g., Becker and Mulligan 
1998).  
Despite the considerable number of empirical studies on fiscal illusion available to date, 
the Mill hypothesis has not been tested so far. As will be argued in section 2 in more detail, it 
is difficult to measure a misperception of the tax burden, and it appears to be impossible to 
unambiguously show with survey studies or field data that excessive government spending is 
a consequence of fiscal illusion (see Oates 1988, Dollery and Worthington 1996 for detailed 
reviews). In particular, the available empirical research methods did not allow to distinguish 
between the rationality-based and the illusion-based explanations. 
We suggest an experimental approach to test the Mill hypothesis about the causes and 
consequences of fiscal illusion. Experimental techniques allow for control of preferences and 
information conditions, and this control is necessary to discriminate between rationality-based 
and illusion-based explanations. We present an experimental design appropriate to investigate 
whether tax framing is a cause, and whether excessive redistribution is a consequence of fiscal 
illusion. To do so, we provide a novel combination of two well-established lines of 
experimental research. We combine a competitive experimental market (e.g., Smith et al. 
1982) with an experimental voting study (see Palfrey 1991). In our experiment, subjects earn 
income in a competitive experimental market from trading, and vote on a proposal to tax 
market transactions and to redistribute tax revenues. The tax is either framed as a “visible” 
direct tax or an “invisible” indirect tax. Except for the framing the two tax regimes are 
perfectly equivalent. In our experiment, subjects can repeatedly vote on the tax-redistribution 
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proposal. A particular sequencing of tax frames is implemented allowing us to study whether 
people eventually learn to overcome fiscal illusion.  
With respect to the causes of fiscal illusion, our results show that the tax burden 
resulting from indirect taxation is systematically underestimated, whereas this is not the case 
with direct taxation. With respect to the consequences of fiscal illusion, we show that fiscal 
illusion induces inexperienced voters to approve of a tax-redistribution proposal which is not 
in their material self-interest. In particular, we find that redistribution is accepted in 9 out of 
10 cases when taxation is indirect, while it is rejected in 9 out of 10 cases when taxation is 
direct. However, we also find significant effects of learning from experience. When the 
referendum is repeated under constant conditions, fiscal illusion is still present at the 
individual level, but ceases to have significant effects on redistribution. If voters who are 
experienced in one tax frame are confronted with the other tax frame (e.g., those who voted 
on financing redistribution with direct taxes twice now vote on financing it by indirect taxes), 
we find no effect of fiscal illusion. Therefore, subjects not only learn from experience, but 
also seem to be able to do “transfer learning” (Cooper and Kagel 2003).  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses empirical problems in identifying 
the causes and consequences of fiscal illusion by means of survey studies and field data. 
Section 3 provides a description of the experimental design. Section 4 reports the results, and 
section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2.  Requirements for testing the Mill hypothesis  
This section discusses the requirements that have to be met by an empirical 
investigation to test the Mill hypothesis, i.e., to unambiguously show whether (i) fiscal 
illusion exists, (ii) fiscal illusion is caused by tax framing, (iii) excessive government activity 
is a consequence of fiscal illusion, and whether (iv) voters eventually learn to overcome fiscal 
illusion, if it exists at all. These requirements are very demanding. To our knowledge, neither 
survey nor econometric studies are available which fulfill all requirements. We claim that the 
experimental design presented in section 3 meets all of the requirements explained below. 
(i) To be able to show that fiscal illusion exists, the individual perception of the tax 
burden resulting from a particular tax has to be measured. Several survey studies have 
investigated the “visibility” of various taxes (e.g., Schokkaert 1988, Cullis and Lewis 1985). 
Economists tend to be skeptical about the reliability of survey studies because respondents 
have no incentives to report their perception thoughtfully or truthfully. A more important 
limitation of survey studies is that they do not provide any indication of the extent of 
misperception of the tax burden.
1 To evaluate whether there is misperception, one has to 
compare the true tax burden an individual bears with his or her perception of the tax burden. 
Unfortunately, even specialized economists disagree on the tax burden of indirect taxes (see 
for example, the debate on the “double dividend” from indirect taxes on energy). Therefore, it 
appears to be difficult to establish even the very existence of fiscal illusion (however, for 
interesting attempts see Gemmell et al. 1999 or Fujii and Hawley 1988). 
                                                 
1   In contrast to economic incidence (which determines the tax burden), a misperception of the legal incidence 
is easy to measure. For example, Boeri et al. (2001: 23) ask respondents: “As you know, both employers and 
employees pay pension contributions. Which fraction of your gross monthly salary/wage goes to public 
pensions? (Please take into account also your employer contributions).” The authors find that in France 52 
percent of respondents underestimate this fraction while only 4 percent overestimate the fraction. In 
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(ii) Suppose the problems mentioned in (i) could somehow be solved, i.e., suppose the 
misperception of the tax burden from a particular tax could be reliably measured. To be able 
to show that tax framing causes this misperception, the researcher would have to find two 
taxes that are identical with respect to the tax burden, and to compare the relative 
misperception associated with these taxes. This is so because a framing effect prevails if 
different representations of the objectively same situation provoke different cognitive 
evaluations of the situation (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). For example, a researcher would 
have to find a tax reform in which taxpayers are first exposed to a direct tax, then to an 
indirect tax which is shifted to taxpayers to such an extent that the resulting tax burden is the 
same in both cases. He could then (in principle) measure and compare the misperception in 
both cases. Unfortunately, such a natural experiment appears to be difficult to find. 
(iii) Suppose the problems discussed in (i) and (ii) could be solved, i.e., suppose that it is 
possible to identify tax framing as a cause of fiscal illusion. To be able to show that fiscal 
illusion indeed translates into distorted fiscal decisions, a researcher would have to analyze 
the effect of individual misperception on individual voting decisions. However, such 
individual-level data are usually not available because voting is frequently anonymous.  
(iv) Finally, to investigate whether voters eventually learn to overcome fiscal illusion, 
one would have to analyze a sequence of differently framed referenda under unchanged 
conditions. While such referenda are held in some places (e.g., in Switzerland), they take 
place under widely varying economic and political conditions. 
In view of the insufficient quality of available field data, Wallace E. Oates (1988: 66) 
concludes in his survey that the empirical “literature has not made a persuasive case for [the] 
                                                                                                                                                         
Germany, 45 percent underestimate and 13 percent overestimate, and in Spain the respective figures are 68 
and 5 percent. 
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existence and importance” of fiscal illusion.
2 The main reason is that field observations which 
are consistent with the fiscal illusion hypothesis, are usually also consistent with hypotheses 
based on the assumption of fully rational agents (e.g., Marshall 1991).  
 
3.  An experimental approach to fiscal illusion 
3.1  Experimental design and hypotheses 
This experimental study compares behavior in two treatments. In both treatments, 
subjects first participate in a competitive experimental market where they earn market income 
from trading. In both treatments, subjects vote in a referendum on a proposal to tax market 
transactions and to redistribute tax revenues. If the proposal passes, the tax-redistribution 
scheme is implemented. If the proposal fails, trading continues as before. The two treatments 
exclusively differ by the sequence of tax regimes. Redistribution is either financed by a 
transaction tax levied on buyers or sellers. As a consequence of our parameter choices, the 
transaction tax cannot be shifted if levied on the buyers, but is fully shifted in equilibrium if 
levied on the sellers. By definition, direct taxes are taxes which cannot be shifted, whereas 
indirect taxes can be shifted.
3 Therefore, the two tax regimes exclusively differ by whether 
redistribution is financed by a direct tax or by an indirect tax.  
Figure 1 serves two purposes. First, it illustrates the basic idea of our experiment. 
Second, the figure is drawn using actual experimental parameters. These will be explained in 
detail in section 3.2, and the figure serves as a reference for that discussion. In both 
                                                 
2  Dollery and Worthington (1996) reconfirm this conclusion. 
3  According to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980: 427), this incidence-based distinction between direct and indirect 
taxes is the one that is most common in the public finance literature. However, criteria based on the method 
of administration of tax payments or on the possibility to adjust the tax payment to individual characteristics 
of the taxpayer are also used in the literature to distinguish between direct and indirect taxes. 
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treatments, subjects first trade under the same market conditions (induced supply and demand 
S0, D0). If a transaction tax is levied on the buyers (left part of figure 1), the demand schedule 
is shifted down to D1. Since demand and supply intersect in the perfectly inelastic range of 
demand, the imposition of the tax affects neither the equilibrium price nor the equilibrium 
quantity. Since the direct tax cannot be shifted in equilibrium, the entire tax burden is borne 
by the buyers. 
Figure 1:  Induced supply and demand in the two tax regimes 
  Transparent Tax regime (TT)  Intransparent Tax regime (IT) 
If a transaction tax is levied on the sellers (right part of figure 1), the supply schedule is 
shifted up to S1. The imposition of the tax does not affect the equilibrium quantity, but causes 
equilibrium prices to rise exactly by the amount of the tax. That is, the indirect tax is fully 
shifted to the buyers, and the entire tax burden is borne by the buyers. Therefore, the tax 
burden is the same in both tax regimes, and the two regimes are perfectly equivalent in 
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claims that the same rent distribution prevails in equilibrium irrespective of whether the tax is 
levied on the buyers or on the sellers (see e.g., Kotlikoff and Summers 1987). 
When subjects vote on the proposal to introduce the tax and redistribute a part of the 
revenues, they know all market parameters and the terms of the proposal in detail. Therefore, 
they possess sufficient information to take a rational voting decision. In particular, subjects 
know that the amount of money redistributed to subjects is smaller than the tax revenue in 
both treatments. A rational voter approves of the proposal if the proposal increases his net 
income. Since the entire tax burden is borne by buyers and their per capita income from 
redistribution is smaller than their per capita tax burden in equilibrium, rational buyers will 
reject the proposal in both treatments.  
Even though the treatments are identical in terms of equilibrium incomes, they may not 
be cognitively identical. We hypothesize that the framing of taxation (i.e., direct vs. indirect 
taxation) systematically affects the perception of the tax burden. In particular, we hypothesize 
that the tax burden resulting from direct taxation is “transparent” whereas the tax burden 
resulting from indirect taxation is “intransparent” to subjects. The reason for this 
intransparency is that subjects have to perceive that the indirect tax will be incorporated into 
prices. As a consequence, we call the tax regime with direct taxes the Transparent Tax (TT), 
and the regime with indirect taxes the Intransparent Tax (IT). More specifically, we 
hypothesize that the tax burden from indirect taxation will be underestimated compared to 
perfectly equivalent direct taxation. If this underestimation is pronounced enough, some 
buyers may hold the illusionary belief to gain from redistribution. This illusionary belief may 
then induce them to vote for redistribution when it is financed by indirect taxes, but not when 
it is financed by direct taxes.  
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In the following, we argue that our design is appropriate to investigate whether (i) fiscal 
illusion exists, (ii) tax framing causes fiscal illusion, and (iii) fiscal illusion distorts fiscal 
choices in a referendum, and whether (iv) voters learn to overcome fiscal illusion. 
(i) To investigate whether there is fiscal illusion at all, we have to measure a subject’s 
actual perception of the tax burden and to determine to what extent this perception is 
erroneous. Subjects are asked to provide expectations about market prices and quantities in 
case of rejection and acceptance of the referendum. From these expectations the expected 
change in net income can be calculated (see section 4.2 for details). As will be shown below, 
we do observe systematic differences between perceived and actual changes in net income in 
the two tax frames.  
(ii) To isolate tax framing as a cause of fiscal illusion we need to implement a ceteris 
paribus variation in which only the representation but not the rent distribution is varied. For 
the two types of taxes to produce identical economic outcomes, tax liability side equivalence 
must hold. For this equivalence to hold, markets must equilibrate. As a consequence, we 
chose an experimental market institution that rapidly converges to competitive equilibrium 
outcomes. 
(iii) To isolate the consequences of fiscal illusion, i.e., to be able to show that fiscal 
illusion distorts voting decisions, we have to eliminate other factors which may also distort 
voting decisions as far as possible. The design was chosen to foster voting consistent with 
material self-interest. This consistency may fail to hold for two reasons. First, voters may not 
vote consistent with material self-interest even though material self-interest is their only 
motive. For example, voters may cast their votes randomly because they may believe that 
their individual vote will not affect the outcome of the referendum. This type of behavior is 
more likely if the electorate is large. To minimize the incidence of this type of random voting, 
we chose a relatively small electorate. Second, voters may not vote consistent with material 
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self-interest because they have non self-interested motives. Suppose, for example, that the 
pre-proposal distribution of rents is such that buyers earn higher market incomes than sellers. 
If a buyer is inequality averse he or she may vote for redistribution in order to reduce income 
inequality. To avoid this type of confound, we use automated sellers instead of human 
subjects in the role of sellers. These automated sellers trade according to pre-specified and 
commonly known rules on the market (see section 3.2 for details), but they do not vote. 
Rapid equilibration of the experimental market is not only important to isolate tax 
framing as a cause of fiscal illusion as explained in (ii) above. It is also important to 
unambiguously identify the consequences of fiscal illusion. We explained earlier that buyers 
lose net income in equilibrium if the proposal passes. This is not necessarily the case if 
markets do not equilibrate. Suppose, for example, that market prices adjust very slowly to the 
indirect tax. Suppose a buyer correctly anticipates such a disequilibrium price path and 
approves of the proposal. This voting decision is not the result of fiscal illusion (no 
misperception) but of a market in disequilibrium. To avoid this type of confound we chose a 
market institution which is known to equilibrate quickly.  
(iv) To investigate whether voters eventually learn to overcome fiscal illusion, we let 
subjects vote three times on the proposal. We vary the sequence of the tax regimes across 
treatments to assess whether experience learning and transfer learning can explain a vanishing 
effect of fiscal illusion on redistribution. 
 
3.2 Procedures  and  parameters 
Subjects first participate in a competitive experimental market where they earn market 
income (see Phase 0 in figure 2). Subjects then go through 3 phases, each consisting of two 
parts. The first part is a referendum on a proposal to tax subsequent market transactions and to 
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redistribute the revenues from this tax to market participants. The second part of a phase is a 
series of 15 market periods in which subjects earn market incomes, and receive income from 
redistributed tax revenues if the proposal has been accepted. If the proposal has been rejected 
the same conditions as in phase 0 prevail. 
The treatments exclusively differ by the sequence of tax regimes (see figure 2). In 
treatment TT-TT-IT, participants vote on a referendum to finance redistribution by a direct tax 
in phases 1 and 2, followed by an in direct tax. In treatment IT-IT-TT, the 1
st and 2
nd 
referendum is on an indirect tax, followed by a direct tax. The purpose of this sequencing is 
threefold. First, the comparison in the 1
st phase across treatments serves to uncover whether 
there is fiscal illusion at all. Second, the comparison of the 1
st to the 2
nd phase within a 
treatment serves to detect experience learning. Finally, the comparison of the 1
st and 3
rd phase 
across treatments serves to test for transfer learning. 

























The competitive experimental market is a computerized two-sided auction with 4 human 
buyers and 2 automated sellers (see instructions in appendix A). Each of the 4 buyers can buy 
at most two units having a value of vi = 140 points each, and total supply by the 2 automated 
sellers is 12 units (see figure 1 and table 1). The equilibrium quantity is q* = 8 units in all 
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cases. The equilibrium price is p* ∈ [100, 105] points in phase 0 as well as in TT, and in IT if 
the proposal is rejected. If the proposal passes, a transaction tax of 25 points is levied on the 
buyers (in TT) or on the sellers (in IT). In this case, the equilibrium price in IT increases to p* 
∈ [125, 130] points. During the experiment all payoffs are denoted in points. At the end of the 
experiment point incomes are converted into Euros at the exchange rate of €0.05 per 10 
points.  
Table 1:  Overview over parameters in the regimes with Transparent Tax (TT) and 
Intransparent Tax (IT) 
 Transparent 
 Tax (TT) 
Intransparent  
Tax (IT) 
Number of buyers (n) 4  4 
Number of automated sellers (m) 2  2 
Number of market periods (t = 1,..., T) 15  15 
Equilibrium quantity (q*) 
(if proposal accepted and if rejected) 
8 8 
Equilibrium price (p*) 
before proposal and if proposal rejected 
100 to 105  100 to 105 
Transaction tax (Tax) (if proposal accepted)  25  25 
Transaction tax levied on  Buyers  Sellers 
Equilibrium price if proposal accepted  100 to 105  125 to 130 
Equilibrium tax burden  
(per period t) on each buyer i if proposal accepted 
- 50  - 50 
Equilibrium redistribution income [Ri(t)] 
(per period t) for each buyer i if proposal accepted
+ 200 / 6  + 200 / 6 
Equilibrium net tax burden (∆Ei[Inc(t)]) 
(per period t) on each buyer i if proposal accepted 
-16.66 (= - 50 + 200 / 6)  -16.66 (= - 50 + 200 / 6) 
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In both treatments, buyers bear the full tax burden and lose net income in equilibrium. 
The following calculation shows that this is indeed the case, using TT as an example (see also 
table 1). Since the equilibrium price is p* = 100 (105) points, a buyer’s net income is 80 (70) 
points if the proposal is rejected. If it is accepted, income falls by the amount of the tax (= 25 
points) on each of the two units to 30 (20) points. The redistribution income is obtained by 
dividing the total tax revenue of 200 (= 8 units times 25 points) by the number of agents in the 
market (6 = 2 sellers plus 4 buyers). As a consequence, a buyer’s net income falls from 80 
(70) points to 63.33 (53.33) points per period if the proposal is accepted. Therefore, the 
acceptance of the proposal induces a net income loss of 16.66 for each buyer.  
The competitive market we use is a uniform price sealed bid/offer auction.
4 In this 
auction, buyers can submit integer bids for each unit they can buy. The automated sellers are 
programmed to submit offers for each unit equal to the true unit costs. After the decision time
5 
has elapsed, the bids are ordered from highest to lowest, and the offers from lowest to highest. 
The first q bids higher or equal than the first q offers are accepted. If bids are tied, priority is 
given randomly. The uniform market-clearing price is set equal to the q
th (= last accepted) bid, 
and the number of transactions is q. Note that the instructions (see appendix A) provide 
subjects with full information on all market parameters, the programming of the automated 
sellers, and the price and quantity determination rule. 
Proposal and voting rules 
At the beginning of each of the 3 main phases, buyers vote on a proposal (see figure 2). 
Subjects are handed out instructions explaining the proposal and the rules of the referendum 
in great detail (see appendix B). Only the 4 buyers can vote, and the referendum is 
                                                 
4  See Smith et al. (1982) for a detailed description of the sealed bid/offer auction. We did not use the double 
auction (which is well-known for its capacity to generate competitive equilibria) because it is very difficult to 
simulate sellers in this auction. 
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anonymous. Each voter either approves or disapproves, abstentions are not possible. If at least 
two voters approve of the proposal, the redistribution scheme is implemented for the 
following 15 market periods. If the proposal is rejected, trading goes on as in phase 0. 
Subjects are given 12 minutes to study the instructions and to think about the proposal. 
Meanwhile, subjects can access data from the past 15 trading periods. The computer shows 
individual information (unit values, individual purchases, accumulated and per period 
earnings) as well as information on the market as a whole (market quantity and price for each 
period). 
Before subjects cast their votes in the computerized ballot, they have to correctly answer 
several control questions. In particular, they have to calculate their individual redistribution 
income and their tax payment in case the proposal passes, assuming that the equilibrium 
quantity prevails (see appendix C). Subjects have to report their expectations about market 
prices and quantities for the subsequent periods 1, 4, 7, 10, and 13. Subjects report their 
expectations before the results of the referendum are announced, and they do so for both 
possible outcomes of the referendum. Expectations are motivated by monetary incentives.
6  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
5  Decision time was gradually reduced from 60 seconds (first market period) to 25 seconds (last market 
period). 
6  A subject receives 30 points of additional earnings, if the expected price does not deviate by more than 5 
points from the actual price in the corresponding period. In addition, 30 points are paid if the expected 
quantity is equal to the actually traded quantity. 
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4. Results 
We ran 20 laboratory markets in 2003 at the University of Innsbruck. 80 students from 
all disciplines at the University of Innsbruck participated in one of the two treatments. The 
average subject earned €28 (including a €4 show-up fee) within about 2.5 hours. The 
experiments were programmed with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1998). 
This study yields two main results. First, fiscal illusion distorts democratic decisions and 
leads to “excessive” redistribution when voters are inexperienced. In particular, redistribution 
which causes voters to lose money is accepted in 9 out of 10 cases when taxation is indirect, 
but rejected in 9 out of 10 cases when taxation is direct in the 1
st referendum. Below, we show 
step by step that the income-effects of redistribution are intransparent to subjects if it is 
financed by an indirect tax, and that it is indeed fiscal illusion that causes these distorted 
democratic outcomes. We begin by showing that markets equilibrated which implies that 
redistribution in fact caused monetary losses to voters (see 4.1). We then show that tax 
framing induced different expectations about the income-effects of the proposal in the two tax 
frames. Section 4.2 shows that voters correctly expected to lose with direct taxation while 
they expected to gain from redistribution with indirect taxation, and that these biased 
perceptions translated into voting decisions. 
The second main result is that voters eventually learn to overcome fiscal illusion to 
some extent. Section 4.3 shows that if the referendum is repeated under exactly the same 
conditions, expectations are more accurate, and fiscal illusion ceases to have a significant 
effect on redistribution. We also find some evidence of transfer learning. If voters who are 
experienced with referenda on transparent taxes are confronted with an intransparent tax, the 
distorting effects are less pronounced than if voters have no such experience. 
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4.1  Tax liability side equivalence and tax framing 
With respect to market outcomes, we find the following: 
Result R1  Experimental markets equilibrate quickly and reliably. Equilibration prevails 
irrespective of tax framing, i.e., tax liability side equivalence holds. Therefore, 
redistribution causes considerable net income losses in both tax regimes. 
Figure 3 shows the per-period prices averaged across all 20 markets. As can be seen, 
average transaction prices remained in the predicted range (see table 1) in almost all periods 
irrespective of whether the proposal was accepted or rejected.  




















markets with direct tax
markets with indirect tax
01 3 2
phase
To test whether tax liability side equivalence holds, we run a regression of profits on the 
tax regime (= 1 in IT), phases, whether the proposal was accepted, with interaction effects for 
regime*acceptance, regime*phase, and regime*acceptance*phase (regression with robust 
standard errors, 20 clusters, n = 3600 observations, R
2 = 0.598). The only significant variable 
is the acceptance of the proposal. The estimated value is a loss of 16.79 points while the 
predicted value is a loss 16.66 points (see table 1). Most importantly, the estimate for the 
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interaction term regime*acceptance is far from being significant (coefficient = -1.24, p = 
0.638). This means that the acceptance of the proposal reduced profits almost exactly as 
theoretically predicted, and that the income-reducing effect of accepting the proposal was not 
different in the two tax regimes. From this, we conclude that markets almost perfectly 
equilibrated and that tax liability side equivalence in fact holds.
7 As a consequence, the two 
treatments indeed are different representations of the same decision situation. 
 
4.2  Perception of the tax burden and voting 
Our main finding with respect to the perception of the tax burden is stated in result R2. 
Result R2  Misperception of the tax burden is much more pronounced with the indirect tax 
than with the direct tax. Therefore, the indirect tax is intransparent, and tax 
framing causes fiscal illusion. 
To provide support for result R2, we calculate a measure of misperception of the net tax 
burden from individual expectation data. Subjects report expectations on market prices and 
quantities for periods t = 1, 4, 7, 10 and 13 of the current phase in case the proposal is 
accepted and in case it is rejected. From these data, we calculate a measure of the perceived 
net tax burden for each subject, i.e., the expected change in net income from the acceptance of 
the proposal. We use the following notation:   
vi      Subject i’s induced value for each transaction (constant at 140, see figure 1). 
eip(t|j)   Subject i’s price expectation for period t, provided the proposal is accepted (j = 
1), or rejected (j = 0). 
eiq(t|j)   Subject i’s expectation about market quantity in period t, provided the proposal 
is accepted or rejected. 
                                                 
7  This finding is in line with Kachelmeier et al. (1994), Ruffle (2001), Borck et al. (2002), and Riedl and Tyran 
(2003) who show that the tax liability side equivalence holds in various experimental markets.  
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eiQi(t|j)  Measure of subject i’s expectation about quantity bought by buyer i in period t, 
provided the proposal is accepted or rejected. eiQi(t|j) = (1/n) eiq(t|j), where n : 
number of buyers (= 4).
 8 
Tax     Per unit transaction tax of 25 points.  
Ri(t)     Measure  of  subject  i’s expected redistribution income.  
Ri(t) = Tax . eiq(t|1) . [1/(n+m)] , where  m: number of sellers (= 2). 
∆Ei[Inc(t)]  Measure of subject i’s expected change in net income in period t  from 
implementing the proposal. 
 
In TT, the expected change in net income from redistribution in period t for buyer i is  
(1)   ∆Ei[Inc(t)|TT] = {[vi - eip(t|1)] . eiQi(t|1) – [vi - eip(t|0)] . eiQi(t|0)} + Ri(t) – eiQi(t|1) 
. Tax .  
The corresponding expression for the intransparent tax regime IT is 
(2)  ∆Ei[Inc(t)|IT] = {[vi - eip(t|1)] . eiQi(t|1) – [vi - eip(t|0)] . eiQi(t|0)} + Ri(t) .  
According to (1) and (2), the expected net tax burden consists of three elements: the 
change in expected market income, the expected redistribution income, and (in TT) an 
expected tax payment. From the per-period measures (1) and (2), we calculate a measure of 
the net tax burden for each subject over all T = 15 periods of the respective phase 
(∆Ei[Inc(T)]). To do so, we simply average expected net income changes over reported 
periods.  
Suppose a subject expects no change in market income due to direct taxation. In this 
case, the first term in (1) is equal to zero. That is, the net tax burden in TT is the difference of 
the expected redistribution income Ri(t) and the expected tax payment: 
(3)  ∆Ei[Inc(T)|TT; p,q  = const.] = [(1/(m+n)) – (1/n)] [eiq(t|1) . Tax] < 0  for m > 0.  
                                                 
8 Subject  i’s indication of the expected market price in a particular period eip(t|j) is a perfect measure of the 
price subject i expects to pay since all subjects pay the same price for all transactions in each period (uniform 
price auction). Even though all subjects are symmetric by design, subjects may trade different quantities (in 
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It is easy to see that (3) is always negative if m > 0. The intuition for this result is that 
the tax is paid and borne exclusively by the n buyers whereas the tax revenue is redistributed 
to all m + n market participants, including the m sellers. Hence, it should be cognitively 
simple to perceive that the proposal results in income losses in TT because losses are correctly 
expected given the correct expectation that market income remains constant. 
Now consider the intransparent tax regime IT. Suppose again a subject expects his or 
her market income to remain unaffected by the tax. In this case, however, the assumption of 
constant market income is incorrect, and would lure a subject to believe that he or she gains 
from redistribution:  
(4)  ∆Ei[Inc(T)|IT, p,q  = const.] = Ri(t) > 0  for eiq(t|1) > 0.  
Therefore, to correctly perceive a loss from redistribution, a subject has to perceive that 
market income falls at least by Ri(t), or, assuming unchanged quantities, that prices rise at 
least by two thirds of the imposed indirect tax [= n / (n+m) . Tax]. Therefore, it is cognitively 
difficult to perceive that the indirect tax will result in income losses because losses are only 
correctly predicted if a considerable price increase is correctly expected. 
How did expectations on the income-effect of the proposal ∆Ei differ across tax regimes 
in the 1
st referendum? The average subject expected to lose 9.9 points of net income in TT, 
but to gain 10.3 points in IT. According to a Mann-Whitney test, income expectations are 
different between IT and TT at all conventional levels of significance (p = 0.000). Since 
subjects in fact lost income if the proposal was accepted (see section 4.1), the average 
misperception of the net tax burden was much more pronounced in IT than in TT.  
                                                                                                                                                         
disequilibrium). The measure (1/n) eiq(t|j) therefore is an imperfect proxy for individual quantity 
expectations.  
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In principle, tax framing could affect the misperception of the net tax burden through 
price or quantity expectations [see equations (1) and (2)]. However, tax framing did not 
significantly affect quantity expectations eiq(T|j) (p = 0.490, Mann-Whitney test). In fact, the 
lions share of misperception results from underestimation of the effect of the indirect tax on 
prices in IT. For example, a large majority of 72 percent of subjects expected prices below the 
equilibrium level [eip(T|1) < 125], and 30 percent of subjects believed that the tax would not 
be shifted to them at all in IT.
9 A Mann-Whitney test shows that price expectations were less 
accurate in IT than in TT (p = 0.009) in the 1
st phase.  
These marked differences in expectations translate into voting decisions in the 1
st 
referendum. In TT, 23 percent (= 9/40) of subjects expect to gain from redistribution, and 28 
percent (= 11/40) vote for the proposal. In IT, 55 percent of subjects expect to gain from 
redistribution, and 63 percent (= 25/40) vote for the proposal. These pronounced differences 
in individual voting cause the proposal to be rejected in 90 percent of the cases in TT, but to 
be accepted in 90 percent of the cases in IT in the 1
st referendum (see also figure 4). 
 
4.3  Learning to overcome fiscal illusion 
The main result with respect to learning is  
Result R3  Fiscal illusion causes excessive redistribution when voters are inexperienced. 
With experience, fiscal illusion is still present at the individual level, but 
induces no redistribution. Experience and transfer learning explain this 
evolution.   
                                                 
9   On the other hand, 28 percent of subjects correctly expected equilibrium prices of 125 to 130 to prevail in IT 
(55 percent in TT), given the proposal is accepted. This suggests that the instructions were clear and 
information was sufficient to correctly perceive the net tax burden. 
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Support for result R3 comes from figure 4. The figure shows acceptance rates of the 
proposal in the respective referenda. As can be seen, tax framing has a very pronounced effect 
when voters are inexperienced. However, the effect of tax framing is smaller in the 2
nd than in 
the 1
st,  and almost completely vanishes in the 3
rd referendum. In particular, the proposal is 
accepted in 50 percent of the cases in IT, and in 20 percent of the cases in TT in the 2
nd 
referendum, and there is almost no difference in acceptance rates in the 3
rd referendum across 
tax frames (30 and 20 percent, respectively). We now argue that this vanishing effect of fiscal 
illusion can be explained by experience learning and by transfer learning. 





























































Experience learning is simply the ability of subjects to take better decisions in an 
environment in which subjects are experienced. To assess experience learning, we compare 
the 1
st and the 2
nd phase within each treatment.  
In TT, subjects on average expected to lose 9.9 points in the 1
st referendum, and to lose 
20.5 points in the 2
nd. To test whether these expectations are different, we take average 
expectations over all subjects in a market as units of observation. We find that expectations 
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are not significantly more accurate in the 2
nd than in the 1
st referendum according to a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p =  0.114). This absence of experience learning should not be too 
surprising since the proposal was rejected in almost all markets in TT in the 1
st referendum. In 
other words, since almost everyone “got it right” from the beginning, there was not much 
scope for learning.  
In IT, experience learning should be more pronounced since redistribution is accepted in 
almost all markets in the 1
st referendum. In IT, subjects expected to gain 10.3 points in the 1
st, 
and to lose 2.1 points in the 2
nd referendum. Taking again market averages as units of 
observation, expectations are significantly more accurate in the 2
nd than in the 1
st referendum 
according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p = 0.009). Hence, experience learning is present in 
IT. 
While expectations are significantly different across tax regimes in the 2
nd referendum 
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.001), voting behavior is not. According to a chi-square test, 
referendum outcomes are not significantly different in TT and IT in 2
nd referendum (χ
2 = 
1.98,  p = 0.160). We conclude that experience learning is not strong enough to entirely 
eliminate fiscal illusion at the individual level, but strong enough to eliminate its effects on 
redistribution outcomes. 
Transfer learning is the ability of subjects to take what has been learned in one 
economic environment and to generalize it to related environments (see Cooper and Kagel 
2003). In the context of our investigation, transfer learning means that subjects who are 
experienced with one tax regime take better decisions in the other tax regime than subjects 
without such experience. To test for transfer learning, we compare expectations ∆Ei in the 3
rd 
referendum in one treatment with the 1
st referendum in the other treatment.  
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In TT, subjects on average expect to lose 9.9 points without experience (1
st referendum 
in TT-TT-IT), while they expect to lose 19.8 points with experience (3
rd referendum in IT-IT-
TT). These averages are not significantly different according to a one-sided Mann-Whitney 
test (p = 0.227, group averages as units of observation). Given this insignificant effect on 
expectations, it is no surprise that transfer learning has no significant effect on redistribution 
outcomes in TT. In the 1
st referendum, the proposal was accepted once, and was accepted 
twice in the 3
rd referendum which is far from being significantly different (χ
2 = 0.39, p = 
0.531). Hence, there is no evidence of transfer learning in TT. 
In IT, subjects on average expect to gain 10.3 points without experience (1
st referendum 
in IT-IT-TT), while they expect to lose 4.2 points with experience (3
rd referendum in TT-TT-
IT). These averages are significantly different according to a one-sided Mann-Whitney test (p 
= 0.034, based on group averages). Did this significant effect of transfer learning on 
expectations translate into referendum outcomes in IT? In the 1
st referendum, the acceptance 
rate of the proposal was three times higher than in the 3
rd referendum (see figure 4). This 
difference is significant according to a chi-square test (χ
2 = 7.50, p = 0.006). Therefore, the 
effect of fiscal illusion on the acceptance of redistribution is significantly weaker if voters are 
experienced with a similar proposal than if they are not. 
Taken together, we find evidence of both experience and transfer learning in IT but not 
in TT. The joint effect of these two types of learning nullifies the effect of fiscal illusion on 
redistribution. While learning considerably improves the accuracy of expectations, it fails to 
entirely eliminate fiscal illusion at the individual level. In particular, expectations in the 3
rd 
referendum are still significantly less accurate in IT (-4.2) than in TT (-19.8) according to a 
Mann-Whitney test (p = 0.005, one tailed). 
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5.  Summary and conclusion 
John Stuart Mill (1848) suggested indirect taxation as a cause, and distorted fiscal 
choices leading to excessive government spending as a consequence of fiscal illusion. While 
plausible, the Mill hypothesis is empirically highly controversial. The reason is that it appears 
to be difficult, if not impossible, to test the Mill hypothesis with field data. As a consequence, 
the empirical literature on fiscal illusion failed to provide unambiguous evidence for the 
existence and relevance of fiscal illusion. There are two reasons for this failure. First, field 
studies are frequently beset with measurement problems, and a misperception is particularly 
difficult to measure. The second reason is more fundamental, and methodological in nature. 
There are three canonical principles in standard economics: rationality, self-interest and 
equilibrium. To clearly isolate fiscal illusion (which is a violation of the rationality 
assumption) one has to investigate an environment in which the other two principles apply. In 
naturally occurring economies, however, one usually cannot establish beyond doubt whether 
these principles fully apply.  
We claim that our experimental study meets the requirements to isolate the causes and 
consequences of fiscal illusion. To test for the existence of fiscal illusion, we elicit taxpayers’ 
estimates of the tax burden and compare these perceptions to the actual tax burden. To test 
whether tax framing causes fiscal illusion, we implement two treatments which exclusively 
differ with respect to direct vs. indirect taxation. In particular, the two tax regimes are 
identical with respect to efficiency and rent distribution. Our main hypothesis is that the tax 
burden resulting from indirect taxation is cognitively more difficult to perceive than the one 
from direct taxation because indirect taxes are incorporated in market prices. To investigate 
the consequences of fiscal illusion, we observe whether a misperception of the net tax burden 
translates into redistribution.  
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Our results clearly show that fiscal illusion has powerful effects when voters are 
inexperienced. Redistribution is accepted in 90 percent of the referenda if it is financed by an 
intransparent tax while it is rejected in 90 percent of the referenda if it is transparently 
financed. However, voters eventually learn to overcome fiscal illusion to some extent. Fiscal 
illusion continues to distort expectations of twice experienced voters but ceases to induce 
excessive redistribution. 
Our study for the first time provides unambiguous evidence supporting the Mill 
hypothesis of fiscal illusion. To be able to test the Mill hypothesis, we created a simple, 
highly stylized decision environment. Despite the clear results of our study, we believe that 
further research on the causes and consequences of fiscal illusion in more complex 
environments is needed.  
With respect to the causes of fiscal illusion, we show that indirect taxation is cognitively 
intransparent because the tax is incorporated (“hidden”) in the product price. However, the 
degree to which indirect taxes are cognitively intransparent in practice may depend on the 
particular “framing” of indirect taxes. For example, the tax payment is stated separately on 
receipts in some cases (e.g., VAT), but not in other cases (e.g., excise taxes). For a detailed 
discussion of this issue, see Slemrod and Krishna (2003), and McCaffery and Baron (2004) 
for a survey.  
With respect to the consequences of fiscal illusion, our design was chosen to distinguish 
fiscal illusion from other explanations of distorted voting. For example, our design minimizes 
the possibility that a concern for a fair distribution affects voting decisions. However, fairness 
considerations are important in voting on redistribution (see Tyran and Sausgruber 2004). 
These considerations may interact with fiscal illusion, and may exacerbate or mitigate its 
effects.  
  26   
Our design forwards learning, and this may have biased results against long-run effects 
of fiscal illusion. Learning is facilitated because our experimental environment is simple and 
stable, and the information feedback we provide is rich and unambiguous. In contrast, natural 
environments are much more noisy, and it may be much more difficult to overcome fiscal 
illusion there. On the other hand, the long-run effects of fiscal illusion may depend on 
opportunities to communicate (see Frey and Bohnet 1994) which were absent in our design 
but are present in the field. 
This study investigated whether fiscal illusion translates into distorted fiscal choices by 
means of a (direct democratic) referendum. This is a natural choice since it is the simplest 
democratic mechanism, and it is in fact used in some places to determine fiscal choices (e.g., 
in Switzerland and some U.S. states, see Butler and Ranney 1994). However, fiscal choices 
are frequently made indirectly (representative democracy). In a seminal paper, Pommerehne 
and Schneider (1978) have provided evidence that the type of democratic institutions may 
have important consequences for the pervasiveness of fiscal illusion. We believe that the 
interaction of institutions and cognitive limitations has important implications for taxation and 
the size of government. Therefore, this interaction deserves much more attention from 
economists than at present.  
In our view, our results raise serious doubts about the rationality of fiscal choices 
involving indirect taxation. Since indirect taxation (in the guise of value-added taxes, energy 
taxes, social security contributions etc.) is widespread and of growing importance in modern 
democracies, our findings are of great potential importance. However, the discussion above 
reminds us to be cautious with simple extrapolation of such findings. In particular, the issue of 
under which (institutional) conditions voters are able to overcome fiscal illusion remains to be 
further explored. In terms of policy advice, our findings support the venerable presumption 
that a transparent tax structure advances the rationality of political decisions. 
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Appendix A: Instructions on the auction 
 
General Instructions for Participants  
((Original instructions were in German)) 
You are now taking part in an economics experiment. The purpose of the experiment is to analyze decision 
behavior in markets. You will be paid €4 for showing up on time. If you carefully read the instructions and 
follow the rules you can earn additional money. This €4 and all other money earned during the experiment will 
be paid to you in cash immediately after the experiment. In this experiment you earn points. These points will be 
exchanged for Euros according to the following exchange rate: 
10 Points = 5 Cents (Euro 0.05) 
During the experiment we ask that you do not speak to other participants. If you have a question, please ask us. 
We will gladly answer your questions individually. It is very important that you follow this rule. Otherwise the 
results of the experiment will be of no value from a scientific perspective.  
 
The following is a short description of the experiment; detailed instructions will come later. You are now 
participating in a market experiment. In this market there are buyers and sellers who trade units of some 
commodity. You earn money by trading. How much you earn depends on your decisions and the decisions of 
others. The experiment consists of two practice periods and then a number of trading periods. In the practice 
periods you do not earn money but you should take these periods seriously since you will gain valuable 
experience for the paid trading periods. 
 
 
Detailed Instructions for Buyers 
In this experiment each participant is a buyer. You will buy units from automated sellers. These automated 
sellers will sell to you according to the rules of the market. There are several markets running at the same time 
during the experiment. What is happening on other markets is irrelevant for your market and hence for your 
earnings. In your market there are 4 buyers who can buy units from sellers in each of the trading periods.  
What participants can do: 
As a buyer you can submit ‘bids’ to buy from the sellers during a trading period. A bid is the maximum price 
that you are willing to pay for a unit. Each buyer will be assigned a certain number of ‘unit values’. Each buyer 
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can at most buy as many units as the number of unit values assigned. You can submit a bid for each unit for 
which you have a value. 
In every trading period, the sellers submit ‘offers’ to sell units to the buyers. An offer is the minimum price at 
which a seller is willing to sell a unit. Each seller will be assigned a certain number of ‘unit costs’. Each seller 
can at most sell as many units as the number of unit costs assigned.  
How the market works: 
At the end of each trading period the ‘market quantity’ and the ‘market price’ are determined. The market 
quantity is the total number of units traded in the market. The market price is a uniform price at which all units 
are traded in the market. 
 
How the market quantity is determined: 
First, the bids you and other buyers in your market have submitted are collected and ranked from high to low. 
The highest bid is ranked above the 2nd highest bid. The 2nd highest bid is ranked above the 3rd highest bid, and 
so on. If two or more bids are the same, ranks will be randomly assigned by the computer.  
Second, all the sellers’ offers in your market are collected and ranked from low to high. The lowest offer is 
ranked above the 2nd lowest offer. The 2nd lowest offer is ranked above the 3rd lowest offer, and so on.  
A first unit is traded if the 1st ranked bid is higher or equal to the 1st ranked offer. A second unit is traded if the 
2nd ranked bid is higher or equal to the 2nd ranked offer. This process continues until bids are smaller than 
offers at a given rank. The total number of units that have been traded when the process stops is the ‘market 
quantity’.  
Example:  
Assume we collect four bids and four offers in a market period. 
The highest bid is 145, the 2nd highest bid is 130, the 3rd highest bid is 110, and the 4th highest bid is 90. 
The lowest offer is 60, the 2nd lowest offer is 80, the 3rd lowest offer is 95, and the 4th lowest offer is 105. 
A first unit is traded since the highest bid (145) is greater than the lowest offer (60). 
A second unit is traded since the 2nd highest bid (130) is greater than the 2nd lowest offer (80). 
A third unit is traded since the 3rd highest bid (110) is greater than the 3rd lowest offer (95). 
The process stops after the third trade since the 4th highest bid (90) falls below the 4th lowest offer (105). Hence, 
the market quantity is equal to 3 units. 
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How the market price is determined: 
The market price is set at the bid for the last unit that has been traded before the process stopped. All units are 
traded at that market price. 
In the example above three units have been traded. The bid for the last unit that has been traded is 110. Hence the 
market price is set equal to 110. It is important to note that all units in the market are traded at this same price of 
110.  
 
How many units do you trade individually: 
The number of units you buy is determined by the number of bids you have submitted above the market price. 
You do not buy the units for which you have submitted bids below the market price. You may or may not buy if 
your bid is exactly at the market price (your bid may randomly happen to be ranked below another bid at the 
market price so that the offer at that rank exceeds your bid). If you do not submit a bid on a unit (this is 
equivalent to submit a bid of 0), you never buy that unit. 
The number of units the sellers sell is determined by the number of offers at or below the market price. The 
sellers do not sell the units they have offered above the market price.  
 
How your profit is computed: 
All participants can earn profits only if they buy units.  
Your profit as a buyer is computed as follows: 
Profit   =   unit value   minus   market price 
Note that if you buy a unit you will pay less than what you have bid for that unit unless your bid is at the market 
price. In our example, suppose that you submitted the bid of 130 for a unit you value at 150. This bid is above 
the market price of 110. Since you buy this unit at a market price of 110 your profit will be 150 – 110  =  40. 
The profit of a seller is computed as follows: 
Profit   =   market price   minus   unit cost 
Hence, sellers receive more than they have offered for their sold units unless the offer is at the market price.  
How the automated sellers make their offers: 
At any time the sellers follow two rules in offering: 
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1.  ‘Submit an offer for each unit assigned’   
This means that the sellers will submit an offer for every unit they have been assigned a unit cost. 
2.  ‘Submit offers equal to the cost of a unit’   
This means that an offer to sell a unit is always exactly equal to the unit cost. Since the sellers do not sell the 
units that they have offered above the market price, a seller never trades at a loss. 
 
How is the trade presented on the computer screen? 
In each trading period a Decision Screen appears (Figure 1). At the end of each period an Outcome Screen 
appears (Figure 2). After 15 trading periods a History of Results appears (Figure 3). All the numbers in the 
figures in the instructions serve illustrative purposes only. Actual numbers may be different.  
Figure 1: Decision Screen 




Your current Bid 130
Your Value 140









In the uppermost area of the Decision Screen on the left side you see the number of the current trading period 
(here: 2) and the total amount of trading periods (here: 15). Each trading period ends after a predefined time 
limit. The remaining time within a period is seen in the uppermost area to the right (here: 19 Seconds). In the 
beginning of the experiment, the available time for trading is generous and will be continuously shortened 
afterwards.  
The column in the middle shows your values and your current bids for the units. In this example the buyer has 
values for two units. Hence, this buyer can buy two units at most. For this buyer the first unit has a value of 150. 
The second unit has a value of 140. Right under your value of the unit you see your current bid for that unit.  
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The input field on the right serves to enter your bids. To enter a bid you click with the mouse on the field 
labeled ‘Your Bid’ and type in a number. To submit that bid you have to click on the ‘Submit’ button. 
In our example this buyer has already submitted a bid of 130 on his first unit. Consequently, this number is 
shown right below the value of the first unit. During the trading period the buyer can change his or her current 
bid on a unit. This buyer has already typed in a number to the input field of the 1st unit. Pressing ‘Submit’ will 
let appear a message box asking ‘Do you want to replace your current bid?’ Confirming by clicking ‘Yes’ will 
change your current bid. 
 
Rules for bidding 
There are three important rules that you have to follow in bidding: 
1.  ‘Submit bids in the order of the units’ 
You have to bid in the order of units. If you have two units this means that you have to submit a bid on your 1st 
unit before you can submit a bid on your 2nd unit. 
2.  The ‘Improvement-Rule’:  
A bid for a unit with a low value may not be above the current bid for a unit with a high value. If you have two 
units your bid on the 2nd unit may not be above your current bid on the 1st unit. In the example of Figure 1, the 
current bid on the first unit is 130. In this situation if the buyer wishes to bid on the 2nd unit his or her bid may 
not be higher than 130.  
3.  ‘Trading at no Loss’ 
You may not submit a bid above your unit value. In our example of Figure 1, the buyer’s bid for the first unit 
must not be above 150. The bid for the 2nd unit must not be above 130. 
If you violate any of these rules, a message box appears. You make this message disappear by pressing the ‘OK’ 
button. You can continue trading only after pressing the ‘OK’ button.  
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The Outcome Screen (Figure 2) appears at the end of the current trading period.  
Figure 2: Outcome Screen 
2  out of  15 Remaining time (sec.): 15 Period
















Your Period Profit 40
 
 
The uppermost area of this screen appears same as the Decision Screen.  
In the table below, you find your value, your bid, the market price, and your per-unit profit from buying each 
unit. If you have not bought a unit the per-unit profit is 0.  
The three lines under the table show the total number of units traded in the market (Market Quantity), the 
number of units that you have bought (Your Quantity), and the sum over your per-unit profits (Your Period 
Profit).  
Figure 3: History of Results 




Period Market Price Market Quantity Your Quantity Your Profit


































Please do not communicate and wait for further instructions.
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The History of Results (Figure 3) shows the results of a trading phase. A phase consists of 15 trading periods.  
The field to the top right displays your unit values. In the table under that you find the market price, the market 
quantity, your quantity, and, finally, your profit for each of the periods in the past trading phase. Actual numbers 
will replace the ‘xx’ in real trading. The example of Figures 1 and 2 is continued in Figure 3. 
The row under the table shows Your Total Profit on all paid periods within this phase. Your Total Profit is 
computed as the sum of your period profits. The periods labeled as ‘Trial’ are not considered in the computation 
of the total profit. 
 
 
Information on unit values and unit costs for the 1st trading phase: 
The following table lists the buyers’ unit values and the sellers’ unit costs in your market. Important: These 
numbers are not hypothetical anymore. These numbers are valid for the following 2 practice and 15 trading 
periods. Note that every buyer has the same value for two units each. The values and costs will be the same in 
each of the following 2 practice and 15 trading periods. 
 
Buyer ID  Unit Values   Unit Costs  
1  140 85 
2  140 85 
3  140 90 
4  140 90 
1  140 95 
2  140 95 
3  140 100 
4  140 100 
   105 
   105 
   110 
   110 
 
 
If you now have questions, please, raise your hand and wait until an experimenter will come by to answer 
your question individually. 
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Appendix B: Instructions on the Proposal 
Below we reproduce instructions for the transparent treatment TT and in brackets [] for 
the intransparent treatment IT.  
 
Proposal 
You and 3 (three) other buyers will now vote on a project. If at least 2 buyers approve of the project (i.e., vote 
“yes”), it is accepted. Otherwise it is rejected. All participants will be immediately informed of the outcome of 
the voting. However, none of the other participants will be informed about your own decision.  
If the project is rejected, we will continue in exactly the same way as before for another 15 trading periods. If 
the project is accepted, the conditions explained below will be used for the next 15 trading periods. At the end of 
the experiment, your profit in points will be paid out in US Dollars according to the exchange rate given in the 
instructions.  
 
What the project is about: 
This proposed project carries certain costs and benefits to you. Now, we will discuss in detail the costs and 
benefits for you. Under the rules of the proposed project, the buyers [sellers] will pay a tax on each unit that 
they buy [sell]. Additionally, you will receive revenues depending on the total number of units that are bought 
[sold] in the market. Here is how the tax and the revenues will be calculated under the terms of the proposed 
project: 
•  You, like all other buyers [The sellers], will pay a tax of 25 points on each unit that you buy [they sell]. 
•  You, like all other buyers, will receive a revenue that depends on the total number of units purchased [sold] 
( = market quantity). In particular, the project generates a total revenue of twenty-five (25) times the number of 
units purchased [sold]. 
Your individual share of the revenue generated by the project is the total revenue divided by six: 
In sum, your individual revenue from the proposed project is: 
 
6
) 25 ( X quantity market
revenue individual Your =  
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How to compute your profit if the project is accepted:  
If the project is accepted, your profit will be your earnings in the market (your unit value minus the market 
price), minus the tax of 25 points, plus your revenue from the project [your profit will be your earnings in the 
market (your unit value minus the market price), plus your revenue from the project]. To calculate your earnings 
in the market, take your unit value and subtract the market price, just as in the previous 15 trading periods. From 
these earnings, you will also subtract a tax of 25 points for each unit you purchased. Finally, at the end of the 
period, you will add your individual revenue from the project. 
Therefore, if the project is accepted, your profit in any period is: 
  Your profit per period     = unit value – market price minus a tax of 25 points per unit you buy 
 plus  your individual revenue from the project. 
  [Your profit per period     = unit value – market price plus your individual revenue from the project.] 
Remember: If the project is rejected, your profit is calculated just as before as follows:  
  Your profit per period     = unit value – market price 
Note that whether the project is accepted or rejected, all unit values and unit costs will remain the same (see page 
9 of instructions). Furthermore, all the rules that were explained to you previously continue to hold whether the 
project is approved or rejected.  
For example, buyers [sellers] continue to trade at no loss.  
 
Example: Suppose a buyer’s unit value is 150. In the past, this buyer was not allowed to submit a bid 
above 150. If the project is accepted, this buyer will not be allowed to submit a bid above 125 because 
of the tax to finance the project.  
 
REMEMBER: Under the rules of the proposed project, you pay a tax of 25 points FOR EACH UNIT THAT 
YOU BUY. You receive your individual revenue from the project ONLY ONCE PER PERIOD. 
 
[Example: Suppose a seller’s unit cost is 30. In the past, this seller has submitted an offer to sell this unit at 30. If 
the project is accepted, this seller will submit an offer of 55 because of the tax to finance the project. 
REMEMBER: You receive your individual revenue from the project ONLY ONCE PER PERIOD.] 
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Appendix C: Control questions 
(These questions had to be answered before the ballot) 
 
Please answer the following questions now. Wrong answers do not have any consequences. If you have 
questions, please, raise your hand. 
 
Suppose the proposal will be approved of. Suppose, in addition, there will be 8 units traded (Market Quantity = 
8).  
What is the total revenue from the tax in this case? 
What is your individual revenue from the project in this case? 
 
Suppose you buy two units in a period (Your Quantity = 2) 
What is the amount of taxes that you pay in this case? 
[Suppose a seller sells two units in a period. 
What is the amount if taxes that this seller pays in this case?] 
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